Florida State University College of Law

Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
Summer 2017

Vulnerable Insiders: Constitutional Design, International Law and
the Victims of Armed Conflict in Colombia
David Landau
Florida State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David Landau, Vulnerable Insiders: Constitutional Design, International Law and the Victims of Armed
Conflict in Colombia, 57 VA. J. INT'L L. 679 (2017),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/547

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

ARTICLE

Vulnerable Insiders:
Constitutional Design, International Law, and
the Victims of Internal Armed Conflict in
Colombia
DAVID LANDAU*
This article, prepared for a conference on “The External Dimensions of
Constitutions” held at the University of Cambridge in September 2016, explains how
the Colombian Constitutional Court constructed a set of rights for a group of vulnerable
insiders—victims of the country’s long-running internal armed conflict. The Court based
its jurisprudence on a 1991 constitutional design that turned towards international law
as a way of resolving a severe domestic crisis of violence and legitimacy. The Court has
drawn heavily on principles of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law to develop a set of protections for Colombia’s massive population of
internally displaced persons, as well as to protect the rights of victims to receive adequate
access to truth, justice, and reparations during peace processes with illegal armed groups.
The Court has generally developed a model of intervention that emphasizes the rights of
victims while preserving flexibility for the state in order to avoid disruption of delicate peace
processes. It has also successfully drawn on a logic of solidarity that identifies victims as
deserving and overlooked recipients of aid by the Colombian state. This very logic may
identify a potential limit of the model: a strategy based on solidarity may successfully
incorporate overlooked insiders, such as internally displaced persons, but it is unclear
whether it will prove as successful with outsiders such as cross-border refugees.

* Mason Ladd Professor and Associate Dean for International Programs, Florida State University
College of Law My gratitude goes to Mila Versteeg, Eyal Benvenisti, and the The Lauterpacht Centre
for International Law at the University of Cambridge for holding the conference for which this draft
was written, and to the participants at that conference for comments that immensely improved the
draft
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much work has focused on the conditions under which domestic
constitutional law will provide international law protections for migrants
and other “outsiders.” This article uses the example of the Colombian
Constitutional Court to examine an important variation on this trend: the
use of these constructs of international law to protect victims of the
country’s long-running internal armed conflict.
Part I locates the origin of the internationalization of Colombian
constitutional law at the politics of the Constituent Assembly of 1991, and
particularly the sense of the President and key members of the Assembly
that the country’s international and domestic public image had suffered
because of frequent crises of order and the draconian emergency measures
intended to restore it. The domestic political class believed restoring the
government’s reputation would require an explicit declaration to signal
Colombia would now play by the rules of a “good” state. The Constituent
Assembly thus passed a series of reforms intended to tether Colombian
constitutionalism more strongly to international standards. These included
provisions giving international law a high status in the constitutional order
and others specifically granting benefits under international law to defined
groups, such as the inclusion of a constitutional right to asylum. Colombian
constitutionalism thus turned outwards as a way to deal with a series of
intractable internal crises.
Part II shows how the Constitutional Court used these provisions to
build a muscular set of protections for the country’s massive number of
victims of internal armed conflict. The construction of victims of armed
conflict as a protected class has been one of the central achievements of the
Court and has had significant impact on both public policy and the ongoing
peace processes. For example, the Court issued large-scale structural
remedies that forced the state to provide more assistance to the country’s
large population of internally displaced persons. This remedy drew heavily
from international standards and guidelines while incorporating protections
traditionally found in Colombian constitutional law. The Court has also
drawn heavily from international humanitarian law in constructing the rights
of victims to learn the truth about what happened to them, to get justice for
crimes committed against them, and to receive reparations, either from
wrongdoers or the state itself, for those acts. It has used these standards to
shape the peace process, first with paramilitaries, and now with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group, in order
to ensure that those processes do not disregard the interests of victims.
In effect, the Court has used a set of international principles to define
and protect a population of insiders who have often been rendered invisible
by existing public policy. Invocations of international law have helped give
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more authority to the Court’s project. At the same time, the Court has
preferred a relatively flexible approach, which incorporates international law
as a fairly ambiguous set of standards. The goal is to require the state to
account for vulnerable groups, rather than requiring that it adopt any
particular stance with respect to those groups. Such an approach—
emphasizing a flexible but robust vision of international law—may be useful
for other courts facing crises involving internally-displaced persons or
refugees.
Part III explores both the promise and limits of the Colombian
Constitutional Court’s strategy. It shows that the Court has successfully
drawn on a logic of solidarity to increase inclusion rather than exclusion of
the vulnerable groups it has sought to aid, and moreover that it has generally
used careful and flexible strategies of intervention that have provided
important input into the peace process without threatening it. However, it
is less clear whether the logic of using international law to protect a
vulnerable group of insiders such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) will
carry over to true outsiders such as asylum seekers; social and political
groups may experience solidarity with the former but not the latter. Indeed,
recent Colombian experience offers some support for such a position.
Despite the extensive jurisprudence on IDPs, the 1991 Constitution’s right
of asylum is one of the less developed rights provisions in the text, and
overall the Court has developed a relatively deferential analysis to the rights
of foreigners. The Court’s recent reaction to migration related to the
Venezuelan crisis illustrates the ambiguities inherent in seeking to extend
IDP jurisprudence to a group of “outsiders.” As Part IV concludes, it is
thus unclear whether the Colombian approach offers a viable strategy for
courts or actors confronting a refugee crisis that crosses national
boundaries.

II. INTERNATIONALIZATION FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES: THE
COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1991
The dominant ethos of the Constituent Assembly of 1991 was the need
to respond to the country’s long-running internal armed conflict. The
Assembly itself was sparked by a sense of institutional crisis and inability to
effect needed changes in order to respond to that crisis: what some analysts
called a “blocked society.”1 The inability to change carried with it the cost
of increasingly high levels of political and social violence in the country. In
1985, for example, the country’s Supreme Court was stormed by a guerrilla
group (the M-19), and a military operation to reclaim the building ended in
1 See Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Colombia: The Governability Crisis, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 193, 196–97 (Jorge I Dominguez & Michael Shifter, eds , 2d ed
2003)
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the death of about half the justices on the Court.2 In 1989, the Liberal
presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán was assassinated as part of a string
of political killings and is viewed as the catalyst for the student movement
that would eventually culminate, after several presidential decrees,
referendums, and Supreme Court decisions, in the Constituent Assembly.3
The Assembly itself was elected through a form of proportional
representation that included a large number of different political
movements, some of whom were newcomers to the political systems. The
Assembly included representatives of several different, demobilized guerrilla
groups including the M-19, which represented the second-largest political
party in the Assembly.4 The inclusion of these groups and other
traditionally-excluded actors, such as indigenous groups, in addition to the
country’s traditional parties, was a core part of the Assembly’s legitimacy.
In order to deal with the internal conflict prior to the drafting of the
1991 Constitution, Colombian presidents had increasingly turned towards
“states of exception,” a term used to describe utilizing emergency as the
major tool to govern and maintain social order.5 This state of exception is
particularly evident in the instrument found in the 1886 Constitution called
the “state of siege,” which could be called unilaterally by the president for a
broad set of purposes related to public order.6 Indeed, Colombia lived under
a state of exception almost all of the time in the 1970s and 1980s.7 Using
these devices, the president rather than the Congress issued most major
pieces of legislation. Presidents also used these advantages to limit or
suspend basic rights, such as the right to a civil trial, and to create new crimes
related to national security concerns, practices with which the judiciary rarely
interfered.8
Concern about the state of siege was one of the core issues at the 1991
Constituent Assembly. The device had come to be seen as emblematic of
the total failure of the Colombian state to contend with the threat of
violence and establish peace.9 Many delegates to the Assembly, as well as
President Cesar Gaviria, argued that the state of siege encouraged repression
by allowing executive officials to carry out arbitrary acts in an unrestrained
way. At the same time, they argued that the instrument allowed “the worst
2 See Manuel Jose Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role, and Impact
of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH U GLOBAL STUD L REV 529, 549 (2004)
3 See Cepeda Ulloa, supra note 1, at 197
4 See Renata Segura & Ana Maria Bejarano, ¡Ni una asamblea más sin nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion,
and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 217, 220 tbl 1 (2004)
5 See Rodrigo Uprimny, The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in
Colombia, 10 Democratization 46 (2003)
6 See id.
7 See id. at 65 tbl 3
8 See id. at 51
9 See Antonio Barreto Rozo, LA GENERACION DEL ESTADO DE SITIO: EL JUICIO A LA
ANORMALIDAD INSTITUCIONAL EN LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE DE 1991 (2011)
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of both worlds” because it had proven ineffective—it was used in an
increasingly chronic way without any discernible improvement in the
security situation.10 Those around the Assembly were also concerned that
the frequent resort to states of exception had worsened the image of the
country internationally. In his address opening the Assembly, President
Gaviria stated that the state of siege had “harmed the prestige of our
democracy.”11 In a subsequent address, he elaborated on this theme as
follows:
While Colombians want to overcome an institutional deficit at all
costs, in the exterior it is thought that our state is so weak that we
live in a permanent state of martial law. Our democracy is
discredited before international opinion by the distorted image of a
powerful state of siege.12
The government and Assembly’s solution to this problem was to create
a greater and more effective set of regulations on the use of states of
exception.13 They were maintained in the new constitutional text—the crisis
of public order that spurred the calling of the Constituent Assembly virtually
guaranteed that this would be the case. But the Assembly sought to
rejuvenate ordinary institutions like the Congress in order to make the
invocation of emergency powers less frequent. The thought was that many
situations previously dealt with by the executive calling a state of exception
could now be dealt with by ordinary powers. Moreover, it created a number
of new limitations and regulations on the states of emergency found in the
new constitutional text, particularly the “state of internal commotion”
designed to deal with threats related to the internal armed conflict.14
The richest set of new limitations were those that tied Colombian
constitutional law to international legal standards, particularly during states
of exception. One revised constitutional article states that norms of
international humanitarian law must be observed “in all cases” during states
of exception.15 The Colombian Constitutional Court since 1991 has been
vigilant in policing the boundaries of states of exception, and thus the
percentage of the time that the Court is under a state of exception decreased

10 See Speech of the President of the Republic, Doctor Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, at the Installation
of the National Constituent Assembly, Feb 5, 1991, in MANUEL JOSE CEPEDA, INTRODUCCION A LA
CONSTITUCION DE 1991: HACIA UN NUEVO CONSTITUCIONALISMO 313, 324 (1993)
11 Id.
12 See Speech of the President of the Republic, Doctor Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, before the “General
Santander” School of Police Cadets, May 16, 1991, in id. at 425, 426
13 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] arts 212–15
14 See id. art 213
15 See id art 214, cl 2
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very sharply after 1991.16 No state of internal commotion has been
successfully invoked since 2002.17 Thus, the 1991 constitution changed the
way the country governed itself during periods of crisis and conflict, making
legal states of exception far less frequent.
Beyond the key issue of states of exception, much of the 1991
Constitution adopted an orientation that was designed to achieve peace and
to make the Colombian state’s actions more consistent with those of
supposedly “normal” democracies. The new Constitution establishes peace
as both a right and a duty.18 Constitutional designers also created a much
more extensive set of constitutional rights than those that had been found
in the Constitution of 1886. For example, the new constitution included
references to human dignity, such as those found in the German Basic Law,
and a long list of socioeconomic rights.19
Additionally, the designers created a new, and quite powerful,
Constitutional Court charged exclusively with protecting the Constitution.
It maintained an existing instrument called the public action, which allowed
any citizen to challenge any law in front of the Constitutional Court at any
time on abstract review.20 It also gave citizens the ability to rapidly and easily
challenge the actions of governmental (and, in limited instances, nongovernmental) actors that violated constitutional rights by filing a form of
individual complaint called the tutela. Citizens can file tutelas without the
assistance of a lawyer, and the designers mandated that judicial decisions
had to be made within ten days of filing at each level of the judiciary.21
Furthermore, the new constitution created a large number of non-judicial
“checking” institutions to monitor and correct the actions of state officials.
Some of these institutions, such as the Defensoria del Pueblo (or National
Ombudsperson) and Procuraduria General de la Nacion (or National Inspector
General) were charged specifically with the protection of human rights.22
The constitution also explicitly reframed the relationship between
domestic and international law, giving international human rights law a
status essentially equal to—and in some cases above—the 1991
Constitution itself. Article 93 provides that the constitution must be
interpreted in light of international human rights treaties ratified by
Colombia, and furthermore that “international treaties and agreements
16 See Uprimny, supra note 5, at 65 tbl 3 (showing that Colombia was under a state of exception
82 percent of the time between 1970 and 1991 but only 17 5 percent of the time between 1991 and
2002)
17 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], octubre 12, 2002, Sentencia C-802/02
(upholding a state of internal commotion declared shortly after President Alvaro Uribe’s inauguration)
18 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] art 22 (“Peace is a right and a duty whose
compliance is mandatory ”)
19 See id arts 1 (dignity), 42–77 (socioeconomic rights), 79–82 (environmental rights)
20 See id. art 241(4)
21 See id art 86
22 See id. art 277, cl 2 (National Inspector General); art 282 (National Ombudsperson)
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ratified by Congress that recognize human rights and prohibit their
limitation in states of emergency shall prevail domestically.”23 This latter
provision again demonstrates the centrality of states of exception to the
1991 Constitution, and the overriding desire of constitutional designers to
ensure that government actions during emergencies complied with core
international standards.
Article 93 can be read as part of a broader global tradition within
comparative constitutional law which relies upon international law to
interpret domestic law.24 Countries place these provisions in their
constitutional orders for a variety of reasons. But, their particular salience in
Colombia was tied to concerns about the problematic actions of the
Colombian state during the internal armed conflict, especially during states
of exception. Article 93 served as a signal to both the Colombian population
and the rest of the world that Colombia would move from being seen as a
troubled, violent, and repressive democracy to being a country that
embraced regional and international norms.
Based largely on article 93, the Colombian Constitutional Court has
created the concept of a “constitutional block.”25 Under this concept as
interpreted by the Court, the constitution includes not only domestic
provisions, but also core provisions of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law (both treaty and custom-based).26 The Court
has used these provisions to limit emergency decrees and legislation dealing
with problems of public order during periods of normality and states of
emergency. The constitutional block “in a broad sense” includes provisions
of international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia, as well as certain
other international law instruments and pieces of legislation. These
provisions must be considered when interpreting the 1991 Constitution.27
The constitutional block “in a strict sense” consists of those provisions of
international human rights treaties that cannot be derogated or limited
during states of exception; these provisions actually have a supraconstitutional status because they “prevail” over all other elements of the
Colombian legal order.28
The interpretations of human rights treaties by authorized interpreters
like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the commissions set up
23 See id. art 93
24 See generally Vicki C Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA
(2010)
25 See Carlos Bernal Pulido, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia:
An Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11 Int’l J Const L 339,
343 (2013)
26 See id.
27 See, e.g., Monica Arango Olaya, El Bloque de Constitucionalidad en la jurisprudencia de la Corte
Constitucional
Colombiana,
PRECEDENTE
2004,
at
79,
85,
available
at
http://www icesi edu co/contenido/pdfs/C1C-marango-bloque pdf
28 See id. at 84
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under regional or international instruments are not formally part of the
constitutional block, but the Court has held that they are entitled to great
weight as interpretive aids for the meaning of international law.29 The Court
also regularly has referred to “soft law” instruments such as guidelines or
declarations, again as an interpretive aid.30 Finally, the Court has routinely
referred to customary international law as well as treaty-based law,
particularly when drawing out the implications of international humanitarian
law.31 In short, the Colombian Constitutional Court has used article 93 and
other constitutional provisions as the foundation for a highly
internationalized constitutional jurisprudence.
Finally, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 includes a fairly generous
set of rights for outsiders. Perhaps most striking among these is article 36,
providing that, “the right to asylum is recognized within the limits provided
by law.”32 This provision is bolstered by others which give aliens access to
the same civil, but not political, rights as Colombian citizens33 and protects
them from extradition for political reasons.34 The older 1886 Constitution
was not silent on the rights of aliens—it contained a provision generally
entitling them to equality in civil rights35—but the new text is considerably
more expansive. In part, the Assembly reflected a broader regional tradition
of recognizing the rights of aliens within Latin America by passing the
provision. The right and practice of asylum have a long and sometimes
troubled history within Colombia36 and in Latin America more generally.
Commentators have noted the phenomenon is distinct from the rights of
refugees, although closely related.37 The Assembly’s decisions here too
29 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 5, 2010, T-616/10, § II 2 2 4
(“[T]he observations and recommendations offered by the organs authorized to interpret international
human rights treaties ratified by Colombia are relevant for clarifying the normative content of their
dispositions and the meaning of the fundamental rights consecrated in the Constitution Even though
these documents are not automatically incorporated into the constitutional block, they do constitute a
relevant hermeneutic criterion and a limit for the legislator ”)
30 A prominent relevant example is Decision T-025/04, which declared a state of
unconstitutional conditions for internal forced displacement and referred extensively to the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement produced by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T025/04 This decision and its incorporation of international law are considered in more detail in Part
III A infra
31 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 25, 2007, Sentencia C-291/07
(considering the constitutionality of a number of criminal law provisions bearing on the internal armed
conflict)
32 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] art 36
33 See id. art 35
34 See id. art 100
35 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1886 art 11
36 See, e.g., Asylum Case (Colom v Peru), Judgement, 1950 I C J Rep 6 (holding that Peru did
not have to recognize a grant of political asylum offered by the Colombian ambassador in Peru to a
Peruvian politician)
37 See, e.g., Discussion Document UNHCR November 2004, The Refugee Situation in Latin America:
Protection and Solutions Based on the Pragmatic Approach of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984, 18
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seemed to respond to an increased desire to make Colombian constitutional
law line up better with international legal standards. Yet the trajectory of
these rights, as explained below, has been somewhat different than those
aimed at internal actors. Despite the right of asylum’s expansion in the 1991
Constitution, it remains to be one of the less developed rights in the 1991
Constitution.

III. THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT
In the Constitutional Court’s hands, these provisions have had a
significant impact on the shape of the internal armed conflict. As noted
above, for example, the Court has used the 1991 Constitution to exercise
much greater control over states of exception and the exercise of executive
power more generally. For our purposes, the key development is the way
that the Court used the “internationalized” orientation of the 1991
Colombian constitution to build up a body of law to protect victims of the
internal conflict. Before the Court began acting in this area, Colombian
public policy largely lacked provisions to aid these victims, identify them, or
account for their interests. Colombian politics often treated actors affected
by the conflict as invisible. The Court’s main achievement, in this sense, has
been to inject a discourse about the rights of victims into the political sphere.

A. The Rights of Internally Displaced Persons
One of the most important lines of Constitutional Court jurisprudence
was aimed at constructing a set of protections for internally displaced
persons (IDPs). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
found that Colombia had 6.9 million IDPs at the end of 2015 (out of a total
national population of less than fifty million). This is the highest number of
IDPs in the world, exceeding even extremely troubled countries like Iraq
and Syria.38 These IDPs have been displaced over many years by both leftwing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. Many have been displaced
INT’L J REFUGEE L 252, 257 n 15 (2006) Several other countries in the region have either a right to
asylum or mention the practice of asylum as a guiding principle of international relations The
constitution of Honduras creates a right to asylum, see CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1982 art 101
(Hond ) (“Honduras recognizes the right of asylum in the form and conditions established by law ”),
while the constitution of Costa Rica states that the country shall be an “asylum” for anyone persecuted
for political reasons, see CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art 31, and the
Constitution of Brazil states “the concession of asylum” as a governing principle of the country’s
foreign relations, see CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C F ][Constitution] art 4 (Braz ) Both the Honduran
and Costa Rican constitutions also include a non-refoulement principle—individuals cannot be sent
back to a country where their lives would be in danger
38 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), GLOBAL TRENDS:
FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, 57 tbl 1 (2016), available at http://www unhcr org/576408cd7
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from rural areas and ended up living in precarious conditions in Colombia’s
largest cities. The causes of internal displacement are complex and often
rooted in both politics and economics, but the underlying causes usually
stem from “illegal armed groups and their actions against civilians.”39
Colombia also has a net outflow of refugees to other countries, although the
scope of this population is considerably smaller than the massive number of
IDPs.40 The internal displacement problem in Colombia has thus been
called “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.”41
The size of this population was already very large in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, but there was at that time no coherent state policy to attend to
the IDPs.42 The Court began deciding a large number of tutelas filed by
individuals or small groups of IDPs, often represented by NGOs.43 In 2004,
after deciding a number of these tutelas, the Court declared a state of
unconstitutional conditions.44 This declaration was based on the Court’s
conclusion that the population affected by displacement was very large–far
too large to aid through individual orders–and that the problems affecting
that population were structural in nature, stemming from deficiencies in
both the budgetary resources and bureaucratic capacity of the state.45 As a
result of this declaration, the Court maintained jurisdiction over the case and
issued sweeping structural orders demanding that the state resolve a
confluence of problems involving IDPs, including their access to emergency
aid, housing, healthcare, job training, and other basic social rights, as well as
reparations for their losses and a possible right of return.46 Subsequently, it
has held regular public hearings, commissioned reports on compliance from
the administration and other state and non-state actors, and issued a huge
number of follow-up orders on many aspects of this massive social

39 Ana Maria Ibañez & Carlos Eduardo Velez, Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: The Micro
Determinants and Welfare Losses of Displacement in Colombia, 36 WORLD DEV 659, 661 (2008)
40 See UNHCR, supra note 38, at 57 tbl 1
41 Manuel Jose Cepeda Espinosa, The Constitutional Protection of IDPs in Colombia, in JUDICIAL
PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE 1, 5 (Rodolfo
Arango
Rivadeneira,
ed ,
2009),
available
at
https://www brookings edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/11_judicial_protection_arango pdf
42 A law was passed giving various rights to IDPs (Law 387 of 1997), but this law was not being
effectively implemented See id. at 7 The Court’s decision emphasized the state’s ultimate accountability
for IDPs even if it was not the sole cause of the problem In this sense, the opinion sounds in broader
notions of state accountability even for non-state action, which as Teitel notes is a common feature of
constitutionalism during transitional justice See Rudi G Teitel, Transitional Justice and the Transformation
of Constitutionalism, in GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 181, 191–96
(2016)
43 See Cepeda Espinosa, supra note 41, at 9 (noting that the Court had reviewed over 100
individual tutelas involving IDPs by 2004)
44 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04, §
III 7
45 See id.
46 See id. § III 10 1
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problem.47 These orders have not overcome the existence of a large-scale
structural problem with IDPs, but they have ensured a substantial and more
coherent response by the state. The state now maintains a relatively
functional process by which IDPs can register with the state, and those on
the list receive a range of social benefits.48 The Court’s orders led to a much
larger budget for IDP assistance and a larger, more coordinated
bureaucracy.49
This case has been extensively analyzed by scholars, largely as an
example of the potential of a structural remedy for widespread social rights
violations.50 Even if the order has not been successful in all its aspirations,
scholars have viewed it as exercising a transformative impact on public
policy towards IDPs.51 As noted by Rodriguez Garavito, the overarching
remedial approach has been robust but flexible.52 That is, the Court has
undertaken a labor-intensive monitoring process through reports and
hearings, and has used follow-up orders to adjust the meaning of compliance
through time. At the same time, the overall shape of the remedy is dialogical;
the shape of public policy on IDPs has not been imposed by the Court but
rather has emerged in discussions between the Court, the state bureaucracy,
civil society groups, and independent state checking institutions.53 In other
words, the chief role of the Court has been to use mechanisms to ensure
that the state was taking adequate account of different problems faced by
the IDP population as a whole or of its subgroups, thus pressuring the state
to provide solutions through a process of dialogue.
It is worth emphasizing the way that the Court carefully constructed and
relied upon international law in its jurisprudence. The decision declaring a
state of unconstitutional conditions contained an extensive discussion of
international law, particularly the Guiding Principles for the treatment of
47 See César Rodríguez Garavito & Diana Rodríguez-Franco, RADICAL DEPRIVATION ON TRIAL:
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 41–42
(2015) (describing the monitoring process in detail)
48 See id. at 36
49 See id. at 53 (pointing out a large budgetary increase since T-025); Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note
41, at 36–37
50 See, e.g., Cesar Rodriguez Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX L REV 1669 (2011) (suggesting that monitoring
mechanisms were the key to the success of socioeconomic rights remedies); David Landau, The Reality
of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV INT’L L J 189 (2012) (arguing that the decision represents a
structural strategy for social rights enforcement that is likely to be superior to other approaches at
reaching the poor); KATHARINE G YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 196–
97 (2012) (exploring the T-025 as part of a “managerial” and “peremptory” conception of role)
51 See Rodriguez-Garavito & Rodriguez-Franco, supra note 47 (arguing that the decision had a
wide range of material and symbolic effects)
52 See Rodriguez Garavito, supra note 50, at 16 (arguing that the Court’s approach was consistent
with dialogic forms of judicial review)
53 See id. (noting that the implementation process for T-025 “set broad goals and clear
implementation paths through deadlines and progress reports, while leaving substantive decisions and
detailed outcomes to government agencies”)

2018]

THE VICTIMS OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 691

IDPs that were produced by the UNHCR.54 These guidelines are a version
of international “soft law” without directly binding effect. However, the
Court used them as its key source for the establishment of international
standards protecting the population. The guidelines helped establish the list
of rights to which IDPs would be entitled across different areas, including
protection from displacement, protection and humanitarian assistance while
displaced, and reparations, return, and resettlement.55 Both the Court’s
initial orders and follow-up orders relied heavily on the Guidelines as a
template for defining the different areas in which judicial involvement was
necessary.
The monitoring process for the IDP decision has also featured
substantial international involvement. The UNHCR has regularly produced
reports for the Court, disseminated information about the judgment and its
follow-up orders, and rendered assistance to IDPs.56 Moreover, its exrepresentative in Colombia has served as a member of the civil society
Monitoring Commission (along with domestic civil society groups and
former members of the Court) that has played a major role in developing
policy proposals and monitoring compliance with the judgment. In the
monitoring process, as Guzman Duque shows, the Guiding Principles have
played not only a legal role as a source of authority but also a political role
as a basis for organizing and presenting claims and duties: civil society
groups representing IDPs have framed claims in their terms, and both the
state bureaucracy implementing judicial orders and institutions charged with
monitoring compliance have organized and evaluated implementation
through its lens.57 In effect, the Guiding Principles filled a normative
vacuum. In the absence of clear domestic standards for IDPs, the Guiding
Principles have allowed both the Court and a range of other actors to point
towards a source of relatively detailed guidance.

54 See UNCHR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN 4/1998/53/Add 2, 11
February 1998 T-025 was not the first time the Court has relied on the Guidelines In prior tutelas
involving IDPs, it had already stated that the Guidelines should be used as parameters for interpreting
and implementing constitutional rights See Federico Guzmán Duque, The Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement: Judicial Incorporation and Subsequent Application in Colombia, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE 175, 177–82 (Rodolfo Arango
Rivadeneira,
ed ,
2009),
available
at
https://www brookings edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/11_judicial_protection_arango pdf The Guidelines were also included as
an appendix to the Court’s decision See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22,
2004, Sentencia T-025/04, annex 3
55 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04, §
52
56 See, e.g., Rodriguez Garavito & Rodriguez Franco, supra note 47, at 114 (giving an example of
the involvement of the UNHCR in the monitoring process)
57 See Guzman Duque, supra note 54, at 191–96; 198–201
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B. The Rights of Victims of Internal Armed Conflict During the Peace Process
The ongoing peace process in Colombia has also been heavily
influenced by the discourse of victims as a protected class under
international law. Perhaps unusually, the peace process has been undertaken
within the framework of the existing 1991 Constitution through laws and
amendments to its text, rather than via construction of a wholly new
constitutional document.58 This has given the Court the opportunity to use
existing interpretations of constitutional provisions, such as article 93, to
shape the process. It has also raised an important conundrum that the Court
has usually managed skillfully—how to insist the rights of victims are
adequately accounted for during the peace process without making the 1991
Constitution too rigid a text to play a transitional justice role.
From its early decisions, the Court made clear that it would enforce
article 93 in order to ensure that legal frameworks for waging the internal
armed conflict were compliant with international humanitarian law.59 This
has given the Court tools to shape the peace process to account for the
interests of victims. The Court has emphasized the constitutional
importance of peace, which was one of the driving motives behind the
writing of the 1991 Constitution and is enshrined as both a right and a duty
in the text.60 It has explicitly endorsed a framework of transitional justice,
holding that the cause of ending the conflict justifies concessions to illegal
armed groups and the use of a broad flexible set of tools, beyond an
exclusive focus on criminal justice.61 But it has also held that peace
agreements must not ignore victims’ rights. For example, it has insisted that
combatants who have committed certain classes of serious crimes may not
escape justice entirely, and it has also emphasized the rights of victims to
receive the truth about the crimes committed against them and reparations
for those wrongs, paid either by the violators or the state.
In 2005, the government passed the Law of Justice and Peace, which
created a demobilization process for paramilitary groups and offered them
significant reductions in criminal penalties in exchange for the group’s
demobilization and disarmament.62 Any reduction in penalties were
58 See Rudi G Teitel, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 197–201 (2000)
59 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995, Sentencia C-225/95
§II 12 (upholding the ratification by Colombia of Protocol II to the Geneva Convention on internal
armed conflict, and emphasizing the importance of article 93 in “harmonizing” international law with
principles of constitutional supremacy); Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 25,
2007, Sentencia C-291/07 (striking down some provisions of domestic criminal law relevant to the
internal armed conflict on the grounds that they were inconsistent with international humanitarian law)
60 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] art 22
61 See Teitel, supra note 58 (arguing that accounts of transitional justice should move beyond
simply prioritizing individual accountability through criminal law)
62 See L
975/05, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ], available at
http://www secretariasenado gov co/senado/basedoc/ley_0975_2005 html
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contingent on a full confession by the paramilitary actor as to all crimes for
which he was responsible, and full cooperation with the process of finding
the truth of unresolved atrocities committed by these groups.63 For even the
most serious offenses, violators would serve only between five and eight
years in prison, and some of this time—such as time spent in special
demobilized zones—could be counted towards the penalty.64 While many
commentators saw the law as a step towards peace, others criticized it as
allowing war criminals to evade justice.65
The Court upheld the basic core of the law but struck down some
provisions and imposed conditions on other aspects of it.66 The Court’s
decision barred the state from granting amnesty for certain serious crimes
under international law and reiterated that any benefit given should respect
the rights of victims to pursue truth, justice, and reparations.67 The Court
also struck down the provisions allowing time in demobilized zones to be
counted as criminal punishment, and imposed conditions requiring that
both the state and the paramilitaries put forth greater resources to ensure
reparations for victims of the conflict.68 Thus, the Court allowed the state
to negotiate with illegal armed groups in service of the constitutional value
of peace, but regulated the nature and extent of concessions made towards
these groups, consistent with their understanding of international law.
Similar concepts have played a role in the more recent negotiation of
peace with the FARC and other left-wing guerrilla groups. To facilitate
peace talks that were just beginning in 2012, the government passed the
Legal Framework for Peace as a set of temporary constitutional articles
intended to facilitate the peace process.69 The Legal Framework for Peace
empowered the Congress to adopt a special law that would give concessions
in the criminal punishments given to members of illegal armed groups who
entered into peace agreements. The law would:
…determine selection criteria that will permit the concentration of
resources of criminal investigation on the top-level actors responsible
for all the crimes constituting crimes against humanity, genocide, or
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See, e.g., Debate: Esta fracasando la Ley de Justicia y Paz?, SEMANA (July 28, 2007),
http://www semana com/nacion/articulo/esta-fracasando-ley-justicia-paz/87297-3
66 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 2006, Sentencia C-370/06
67 See id. § 4 4
68 See id. § 6 2 3 3 (time spent in demobilized zones); § 6 2 4 (reparations)
69 See L
1/12, julio 31, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ] available at
http://wsp presidencia gov co/Normativa/actoslegislativos/Documents/2012/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%20N%C2%B0%2001%20DEL%2031
%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202012 pdf; Acuerdo Final para la terminacion del conflict y la
construccion de una paz estable y duradera, Nov
24, 2016, available at
https://www mesadeconversaciones com co/sites/default/files/24-1480106030 111480106030 2016nuevoacuerdofinal-1480106030 pdf
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war crimes committed in a systematic manner; establish the cases,
requisites, and conditions in which punishments may be suspended,
establish the cases in which extrajudicial sanctions, alternative
punishments, or special modes of executing or complying with
punishments may be applied; and authorize the conditional
renunciation of criminal justice in all of the non-selected cases…70
The amendment also set up other instruments of transitional justice by
calling for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would work on noncriminal forms of justice. Petitioners challenged the italicized language in the
amendment, arguing that it violated fundamental precepts of international
humanitarian and human rights law by allowing prosecutors to ignore crimes
other than those conducted by “top-level” actors and which were not
conducted in a “systematic manner.”71
The Court’s decision reviewing the Legal Framework for Peace is
striking because it was conducted as a review of constitutional amendments,
not ordinary legislation. The Court thus used a super-strong form of judicial
review that it had previously developed to hold some constitutional
amendments unconstitutional.72 Under the Court’s substitution of the
constitutional doctrine, proposed constitutional changes can themselves be
unconstitutional if they would replace fundamental principles of the existing
constitution.73 This decision was recognized by both the Court and the
political branches as one of extraordinary importance. For example, during
the Court’s public audience reviewing the law, President Juan Manuel Santos
himself came to the Court to plead for the law’s constitutionality. In his
words, the moment represented “a real possibility, in my opinion the best
in our history, to put an end to the internal armed conflict.”74
The Court upheld the Legal Framework for Peace, but it also imposed
a set of significant conditions on its implementation. The Court’s ruling
emphasized the flexible nature of international law during a regime of
transitional justice. At the same time, it held that through article 93, certain
70 L 1/12, julio 31, 2012, art 1, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ] (emphasis added)
71 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2013, Sentencia C-579/13
72 This doctrine is not unique to Colombia, but in fact exists in a number of countries found in
regions around the world See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration
and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM J COMP L 657 (2013)
73 Only a Constituent Assembly, wielding its original constituent power to replace the 1991
Constitution, is empowered to make changes of that magnitude See Bernal Pulido, supra note 26, at
341–46 (describing the historical development of the doctrine); Rosalind Dixon and David Landau,
Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L
J CONST L 606, 615–18 (2015) (explaining the utility of the doctrine in stopping President Alvaro
Uribe from seeking a third consecutive term in office)
74 Juan Manuel Santos, Intervención del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos en la Audiencia Pública
del
Marco
Jurídico
para
la
Paz,
July
25,
2013,
available
at
http://wsp presidencia gov co/Prensa/2013/Julio/Paginas/20130725_03-Palabras-IntervencionPresidente-Juan-Manuel-Santos-Audiencia-Publica-Marco-Juridico-para-la-Paz aspx
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core protections of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law not only were incorporated into the Constitution but also
constituted fundamental principles of the constitutional order that could not
be altered even by a constitutional amendment. The Court in particular
derived a “fundamental pillar” of the Constitution—“the promise…to
respect, protect, and guarantee the rights of society and of victims, from
which is derived: the obligation to investigate, judge, and in turn sanction
grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”75
The Court allowed a system of prioritization on “top-level actors”
committing the most serious crimes under international law, even if this
meant that some lower-level actors complicit in these crimes would likely
not be prosecuted.76 It also endorsed the amendment’s multifaceted focus
on a number of tools of transitional justice, including not only criminal law
but also tools like a truth and reconciliation commission, and it gave the
state broad discretion to choose the quantity and mode of any criminal
punishment applied.77 However, the Court required increased transparency
for decisions made to prioritize certain crimes and actors and required that
victims have avenues to challenge those decisions.78 It also demanded that
the perpetrators of crimes make a full recounting of their circumstances and
the nature of their crimes, that the state provide sufficient resources to carry
out thorough investigations even with respect to actors where prosecutions
are not pursued, and that victims receive reparations from wrongdoers and
the state.79 The decision thus allowed the state to prioritize the tools of
criminal justice in a rational manner, but required an emphasis on the rights
of victims to truth and reparations in all cases.80
The government ultimately chose to pursue peace with the FARC using
an approach that built on the Legal Framework for Peace, but also deviated
from it in key respects. In June 2016, the government signed a definitive
peace agreement with the FARC, and Congress passed a new set of

75 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2013, Sentencia C-579/13, §
III 5 4
76 See id. § III 8 3 2 iv
77 See id. § III 6
78 See id. § III 8 4 2
79 See id. § III 8 4 3, III 8 4 5–6
80 In a separate decision, the Court considered article 3 of the constitutional reform, which gave
the Congress broad powers to delineate offenses as political and thus to avoid imposing as a penalty
loss of rights of political participation, with the exception of “crimes against humanity and genocide
committed in a systematic manner” where such rights could not be restored See L 1, julio 31, 2012,
art 3, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ] The Court upheld the constitutional amendment against a charge that
it substituted the constitution by arguing that international law placed fewer restrictions on rights of
political participation than on ordinary criminal justice See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional
Court], agosto 6, 2014, Sentencia C-577/14
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temporary constitutional amendments facilitating the peace process.81 These
new amendments gave the president special decree powers on issues relating
to the peace process, created a special fast-track procedure for the approval
of laws and constitutional amendments related to this process, and stated
that the peace agreement itself would become part of the “constitutional
block” once it was signed and had gone into force.82
The drafting and approval of the final peace agreement and its
associated constitutional provisions reflected the shaping done by the
Constitutional Court and engaged in a kind of dialogue with international
law limits noted by the Court. The initial agreement finalized in 2016 was
widely seen as conscious of international law but as stretching the limits of
the flexibility in a transitional justice framework.83 For example, it required
that members of guerrilla groups who committed the most serious crimes
of international law, such as crimes against humanity and grave war crimes,
be criminally punished by a Special Jurisdiction for peace; but, it
contemplated alternatives to prison involving “effective restriction of
freedom” for those convicted, which some argued was “amnesty by another
name.”84
The initial agreement was narrowly defeated in a referendum, largely
because of concerns that it deemphasized the rights of victims and let the
worst members of the FARC go unpunished. The president and the FARC
then renegotiated the agreement by making modest changes to the text, such
as giving the Constitutional Court potential review powers over the special
tribunal, broadening the responsibility of higher-ranking officers for the
actions of their subordinates, and increasing the requirements on FARC
guerrillas to forfeit assets for reparation funds.85 This Court continues to
review aspects of the peace process.86 For example, in November 2017, the
81 See L
1/16, julio 7, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O] available at
http://es presidencia gov co/normativa/normativa/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%2001%20DEL%2
07%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202016 pdf
82 The fast track procedure would be in effect for six months and could be extended for another
six months by the president See id. art 1 The amendment also provided that the agreement would
constitute a “special agreement” under international humanitarian law See id.
83 See, e.g., Claret Vargas, The Peace Agreement in Colombia Matters, and it Could Set an Example for
RIGHTS
BLOG,
Feb
9,
2016,
at
Entrenched
Conflicts Elsewhere,
GLOBAL
https://dejusticiablog com/2016/02/09/the-peace-agreement-in-colombia-matters-and-it-could-setan-example-for-entrenched-conflicts-elsewhere/
84 See id.
85 See Los puntos clave del nuevo acuerdo de paz con las Farc, EL PAIS (Nov 12, 2016),
http://www elpais com co/elpais/colombia/proceso-paz/noticias/puntos-clave-nuevo-acuerdo-pazcon-farc
86 Other recent major cases have dealt with constitutional and procedural issues not directly
related to the rights of victims See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 22,
2017, Sentencia C-332/17 (striking down parts of constitutional amendments allowing laws to receive
fast-track consideration); Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], julio 18, 2016, Sentencia
C-379/16 (considering and upholding the core of the law authorizing a referendum to approve the
final peace agreement between the government and the FARC)
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Court upheld most of the temporary constitutional amendments that
created the special peace jurisdiction.87 However, it imposed some
important clarifications, again holding that ex-combatants would lose all of
the criminal and political participation benefits of the special system if they
did not cooperate fully in the process by, among other things, telling the full
truth about their acts and contributing to their reparations after fully
disclosing their assets.88 The Court also struck down parts of the
amendment, for example those that would have limited the review of the
Court over the special jurisdiction,89 and those which would have restricted
the normal powers of the national Inspector General to intervene in cases
in order to protect the rights of victims to situations where he or she was
invited by a judge of that jurisdiction.90
In short, the Court has used standards found in international law to
create a protected class of victims from the country’s internal armed conflict
and to give them claims not only to socioeconomic goods, but also to
reparations for the wrongs done to them and a right to know the truth about
those events and to pursue justice against the perpetrators. The Court’s
strategy in this area has combined two key elements. First, it has relied
heavily on the authority of international law. Given the premium the 1991
Constitution placed on recasting Colombia as a “good” democratic state in
the world order, it seems likely that these invocations have had significant
normative force, and the Court’s efforts would have been less successful
without them.
Second, the Court’s use of international law has been strategic and
flexible in nature, and has included an extensive process of translation
between the international and the domestic. Although the Court has relied
heavily on international law as a source of authority, the process has been
richer than a merely passive incorporation of international law. By wrestling
with international standards in a serious way, the Court has dialogued not
only with the political branches regarding public policy but also with the
content of international law itself. At times the Court has given additional
force to provisions that were not clearly binding under international law as
a way to fill normative gaps and to ensure accountability: the UNHCR
Guiding Principles for Internal Forced Displacement offer an example.
During the peace process, in contrast, the Court emphasized the flexibility
of international legal standards and the fact that they were consistent with a
wide range of solutions to the internal armed conflict.91 The Court’s goal, in
87 Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 14, 2017, Sentencia C-674/17
88 See id.
89 These provisions would have required judges of the special jurisdiction to approve any review
of decisions via tutela by the Constitutional Court See id.
90 See id.
91 See Carlos Bernal Pulido, Transitional Justice within the Framework of a Permanent Constitution: The
Case Study for the Legal Framework for Peace in Colombia, 3 CAMBRIDGE J COMP & INT’L L 1136 (2014)
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other words, seems to be to make the political process cognizant of the
rights of victims of the conflict, rather than forcing the state to adhere to a
particular substantive approach.

IV. THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF THE COURT’S APPROACH
This article argues that the Court used the international law provisions
of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 to construct a discourse that
protected the victims of internal armed conflict. In so doing, it adopted a
stance that was consistent with the overall orientation of the Constitution,
which was designed to harness international law as a way to ameliorate a
domestic crisis of legitimacy.
It is worth analyzing the Court’s rich jurisprudence from three distinct
comparative perspectives. The first is the general frame of judicialization of
sensitive, politicized issues: judicial interventions in a peace process raises
obvious risks. I argue that the Court has usually managed to limit these risks
through jurisprudence that is flexible, essentially emphasizing the
importance of the rights of victims without putting political actors in a
straightjacket. The second frame emphasizes the impact of intervention on
the vulnerable group. While aggressive judicial enforcement of the rights of
groups could and at times has accentuated a logic of “otherness,” for the
most part the Court has successfully drawn on a logic of solidarity that has
greatly deepened engagement with victim’s rights within the political system.
However, this very success suggests a limit on the replicability of the Court’s
approach in situations involving true outsiders such as refugees. The logic
of solidarity that justifies the Court’s activism may not exist vis-à-vis outsider
populations. Indeed, as I show below, the Court’s limited and more
deferential jurisprudence on outsider groups such as asylum-seekers stands
in some contrast to its aggressive protections for the victims of internal
armed conflict.

A. Avoiding the Downside of Judicialization
An obvious potential problem of allowing judicial intervention in
something as delicate and highly politicized as the peace process is that it
may pose risks to both the institution of the Constitutional Court and the
peace process itself. Precisely because the Court has constructed so many
tools of intervention in legislation and even constitutional amendments
related to the peace process, it poses an unusual threat to the legal stability
of that process. Unsurprisingly, then, the scope of intervention in the peace
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process played a central role in this year’s elections of new magistrates to
the Court.92
The Court has usually been cognizant of these risks. Its interventions in
the Law of Justice and Peace and the Legal Framework for Peace stressed
the rights of victims without overruling the basic approach taken by political
actors. Its emphasis on flexibility, while maintaining a sense of limits, is an
attempt to guide political discourse without placing it in a straightjacket.
Bernal notes, for example, that in the Legal Framework for Peace case, the
Court made an important change in its jurisprudence on the
unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine by allowing
balancing.93 It recognized that even major changes to constitutional
principles, which might otherwise be struck down, can be permissible if in
service of other fundamental constitutional principles such as peace.
Moreover, in carrying out this balancing, the Court considered not only the
domestic constitution but also the goals of international law in a regime of
transitional justice via article 93.94 In the Law of Peace and Justice case, the
Court also explicitly balanced between the rights of victims and the
constitutional value of peace.95
The Court has also read international law itself as a relatively—although
not completely—flexible system.96 The majority of the Court in the Legal
Framework for Peace case, for example, allowed constitutional changes that
prioritized criminal justice being wielded against the highest-level actors
committing the most serious crimes such as crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide, against the dissent’s view that would have required
such crimes to be prosecuted regardless of an actor’s place in the hierarchy
or level of responsibility.97 The majority justified its view in light of the
inherently flexible nature of transitional justice, as well as the nature of the
conflict in Colombia and resource constraints on enforcement.98
92 See, e.g., El 10 de mayo el Senado elegirá a dos magistrados de la Corte Constitucional, EL ESPECTADOR
(Apr 18, 2017) at http://www elespectador com/noticias/judicial/senado-le-pone-fecha-eleccion-dedos-magistrados-de-la-corte-constitucional-articulo-689907
93 See Pulido, supra note 91, at 1153
94 See id. at 1152–53
95 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 2006 Sentencia C-370/06 § 5
96 In this sense, the majority’s approach is consistent with leading theories of transitional justice,
which emphasize the need for accountability but maintain a number of different ways for a
constitutional and legal orders to achieve these goals, and which emphasize that criminal justice should
be understood differently during transitional moments See Teitel, supra note 58
97 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2013 Sentencia C-579/13,
Gonzalez Cuervo, J , dissenting (arguing that the provisions violated the “minimum obligation” of
states under international law to investigate and punish certain grave violation of human rights and
international humanitarian law committed “under any rank”)
98 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2017, Sentencia C-579/13 §
8 3 2 (justifying the amendment as a response to a context where it was impossible to proceed case-bycase as in ordinary criminal justice and where it was important to clarify the underlying “macrocriminal” structure of the crimes)

700

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 57:3

The Colombian experience thus suggests that judicialization of a peace
process may improve outcomes without threatening stability, so long as it is
undertaken in a certain way. The key is not the extent of judicialization, but
instead the timing and nature of the Court’s interventions. One could, of
course, question whether the Court has been too flexible, allowing the state
to underplay the rights of victims too much. But in this context, the political
risks of decisions can be severe.
Take, for example, the Court’s 2017 decision striking down parts of
temporary constitutional amendments that created a congressional “fast
track” procedure to ease passage of new laws and constitutional
amendments related to the peace process.99 It held that parts of this
amendment that required provisions to be voted on as a block,100 without
the opportunity for further revision in the absence of executive approval,101
were unconstitutional because they clashed with core constitutional values
related to democratic deliberation. The decision only gave legislative
members the ability to make changes to the executive’s proposals during
congressional deliberations without executive consent, while leaving other
aspects of the fast-track procedure intact.102 For example, fast-track
proposals related to the peace process must still receive priority on the
congressional floor103 and can still be approved with reduced procedural
requirements.104
Nonetheless, the FARC stated that the decision had “put the peace
process in the most difficult situation it has lived since its start.”105 Members
of the government also denounced the decision and sought its nullification,
arguing that it made it more difficult for the government to use a key
procedural tool for the implementation of peace. Any piece of legislation or
amendment related to the peace process now faced the possibility of
unraveling on the congressional floor. The decision thus illustrates the
extremely delicate nature of judicial interventions related to peace.

99 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 22, 2017, Sentencia C-332/17
100 See L 1/16, art 1(j), julio 7, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O] available at
http://es presidencia gov co/normativa/normativa/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%2001%20DEL%2
07%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202016 pdf
101 See id. art 1(h)
102 In fact, these aspects of the procedure had been upheld in an earlier decision See Corte
Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 13, 2016, Sentencia C-699/16
103 See supra note 100, art 1(b)
104 For both legislation and constitutional amendments related to the peace process, committee
debates can be undertaken in joint session between the House and Senate, while floor debates must be
conducted separately Furthermore, constitutional amendments can be approved in one legislative
session rather than the normal two See id. art 1(d), (f)
105 Fallo de la Corte sobre acuerdo pone a prueba a mayorías del Congreso, EL TIEMPO (May 19, 2017), at
http://www eltiempo com/politica/congreso/sentencia-de-la-corte-pone-a-las-farc-a-repensartiempos-de-la-paz-89872
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B. Building Solidarity vs. Accentuating “Otherness”
Another theoretical danger of the Court’s approach is that it could
heighten a sense of privileged “otherness” for the particular social groups
affected by displacement or otherwise victimized by the conflict. The Court
has provided a number of protections, especially economic protections, to
these groups. As noted above, the Court has held that IDPs are entitled to
emergency economic assistance, as well as a range of other benefits, such as
assistance with housing and job placement.106 It has also held that the
broader class of victims of internal armed conflict is entitled to reparations
from armed groups or from the state for the harm they faced. Some political
actors have hinted at a critique that these actors are receiving unfair
advantages over other citizens, frequently with the help of fraud. State actors
have at times resisted compliance by claiming that individuals are falsely
registering as IDPs or falsely seeking reparations, and the Court has had to
monitor these processes to ensure that undue obstacles are not placed on
them.107 In the context of broad scarcity and widespread poverty, there
might be some danger that these critiques could stick and lead to backlash
against victimized populations.
Over time, however, a more optimistic story based on solidarity has won
out. Political actors have increasingly tended to recognize the rights of these
groups, effectively incorporating discourses about IDPs and victims into
politics. The Court’s main discursive weapon in these disputes, which is seen
most clearly in the main IDP decision from 2004, is to identify IDPs and
victims as deserving citizens who deserve recognition and support from the
state but who have not received it as a result of lack of political will and
bureaucratic incompetence. The Court’s decisions in these areas have thus
worked in part by rendering invisible (and shameful) failures by the
Colombian state more visible. Rodriguez-Garavito and Rodriguez-Franco, for
example, argue that the IDP decision led to a significant increase in the quality
of press coverage of displacement.108 Moreover, decisions championing the
rights of vulnerable and seemingly deserving groups put the state in a difficult
rhetorical position. The state may seek to drag its feet on compliance, of
course, but the Court has faced little direct pushback on its goals. Some
scholars have argued that the IDP decision itself should be understood as a
strategic response to a difficult political context where judicial interventions
on more conflictual issues would have threatened the Court as an
106 See supra Part III A
107 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 25, 2013, Sentencia SU254/13 (holding that the state must pay the amount of reparations set in the law to registered IDPs
and could not use common excuses to pay the reparations, such as that the registered IDPs may not
actually be victims or that reparations should be set off against other payments to IDPs such as
emergency economic aid or housing assistance)
108 See Rodriguez-Garavito & Rodriguez-Franco, supra note 47, at 130–35
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institution.109 The Court instead was able to make progress on areas where it
could draw on a broad consensus and essentially force the executive’s hand.110
A key moment of political incorporation of the Court’s agenda was the
Law of Victims and the Restitution of Land, passed in 2011.111 The law
adopted the Court’s framing of those displaced or otherwise affected by the
conflict as victims of internal armed conflict who are entitled to extensive
protections under international law. Article 3 of the law defines victims as
“those persons who individually or collectively have suffered harm for facts
occurring after January 1, 1985, as a consequence of violations of
international humanitarian law or grave and manifest violations of
international human rights, occurring as a result of the internal armed
conflict.”112 Many of the provisions of the law tracked the Court’s
jurisprudence and pulled from international law to inform which benefits
should be extended to IDPs. Others have given greater definition to rights
that the Court has had difficulty enforcing on its own. For example, the law
contemplated special legal processes to adjudicate the return of land that
was improperly taken from IDPs, and it set amounts and other procedures
to give them reparations from the state for the wrongs that were committed
against them during the conflict.113 The law thus symbolically embraced the
Court’s framing, although subsequent jurisprudence and struggles have
taken place over the scope and implementation of the law.114
The upshot, then, is that the Court has been fairly successful at
constructing a political discourse of solidarity in which IDPs and other
victims have been unfairly deprived of justice by the state. Rather than
feeding a sense of otherness, its work has more commonly helped to create
a sense of inclusion vis-à-vis these groups.

C. A Replicable Strategy? Insiders vs. Outsiders
The very logic of the Court’s success suggests that it may have less
success in constructing an agenda focused on groups socially identified as
109 See Jorge González-Jácome, In Defense of Judicial Populism: Lessons from Colombia, INT’L J
CONST L , May 3, 2017, at: http://www iconnectblog com/2017/05/in-defense-of-judicial-populismlessons-from-colombia/
110 See id.
111
See
L
1448/11,
junio
10,
2011,
DIARIO
OFICIAL
[D O ]
at
http://www secretariasenado gov co/senado/basedoc/ley_1448_2011 html
112 Id. art 3
113 See id. arts 9, 25
114 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], marzo 28, 2012, Sentencia C250/12 (upholding the temporal scope of the law as applying only to incidents after 1985 as a
permissible exercise in legislative judgment); Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court],
octubre 10, 2012, Sentencia C-781/12 (upholding a provision limiting the law only to victims of
“internal armed conflict,” but holding that that phrase must be understood in a “broad sense”); Corte
Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 24, 2013, Sentencia SU-254/13 (clarifying various
aspects of the right to reparations created by the law)
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“outsiders” rather than “insiders,” such as foreign refugees. The success of
the Colombian story stems in part from a solidarity rhetoric: it was difficult
for the state to oppose granting rights to Colombian victims of armed
conflict. This kind of solidarity with domestic IDPs may be more difficult
to achieve with respect to foreign refugees. Using international and domestic
constitutional law to call attention to the plight of these groups may thus
spark higher levels of active political resistance.
There is some evidence for this distinction within Colombian
constitutional law and politics. The Court’s extensive jurisprudence on the
rights of victims inside Colombia stands in contrast to its scarcer and more
permissive jurisprudence on refugees and others found outside of the
country. The constitutional right to asylum, for example, is one of the less
developed rights in the Colombian constitution. In those relatively few cases
where it has been cited, the Court has given considerable deference to the
political branches, although it has held that the right may be protected by
tutela because it is fundamental in nature.115
The Court’s broader jurisprudence on the rights of foreigners in
Colombia is also fairly deferential. In Decision C-834 of 2007, for example,
the Court considered a challenge to a provision of law that defined the
system of social protection as being “the group of public policies oriented
to diminishing the vulnerability and improving the quality of life of
Colombians.”116 The challengers argued that the italicized phrase should be
struck out or rewritten because the welfare system should be read to include
foreigners resident in the country in light of article 100 of the Constitution,
which gave resident foreigners the same civil rights as Colombians. The
Court rejected the challenge. It noted that all people resident in the
115 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 14, 2003, Sentencia T-704/03
The case involved an Iranian who had been caught with a false passport trying to board a flight to
Miami, and who claimed political persecution He was sentenced to an 18-month sentence for using
false documents, and to be expelled from the country following that sentence Towards the end of that
criminal sentence (and thus several years after entering the country), the petitioner applied for asylum
and was denied, with the authorities both casting doubt on his story and finding that he had applied in
an improper manner by waiting several years to make the application The Court upheld most of the
decision taken against the petitioner It vacated the administrative judgment on the narrow ground that
the administrative actors had not made clear to the petitioner that he would have thirty days after that
decision to legalize his immigration status (if possible), and that in no case could he be returned to the
country—Iran—where he has stated that his life would be in danger (the administrative actors had
already stated that they would not return him to Iran in any case) The fairly limited case law on the
rights of foreigners to seek asylum or refugee status is broadly consistent with T-704: the Court has
adopted a position of substantial but not complete deference See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ]
[Constitutional Court], abril 4, 2005, Sentencia T-32/05 (rejecting the claim of a Cuban applicant for
asylum that he was being denied a right to a vital minimum level of subsistence, instead finding that he
should be deported and that there were other countries willing to take him in); Corte Constitutional
[C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 26, 2017, Sentencia T-250/17 (upholding a decision by Colombian
authorities to deny refugee status to a Venezuelan family, although reversing denial of work visa for
denial of due process because it lacked adequate reasoning)
116 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], octubre 10, 2007, Sentencia C-834/07
(emphasis added)

704

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 57:3

country—whether Colombian or foreign—had a right to receive a “vital
minimum” level of subsistence.117 However, beyond the vital minimum, the
Court held that the legislature had a large “margin of configuration” as to
how foreigners would be included in existing social safety nets.118 The Court
has likewise been insistent in holding that provisions entitling foreigners to
equal enjoyment of civil rights did not prohibit inequalities of treatment, so
long as these were the result of “reasonable justification.”119
Of course, Colombia historically has been an originating, rather than
destination, country for foreign refugees. But the Venezuelan economic and
political crisis has changed that dynamic, leading to an influx of more than
half a million Venezuelans by the end of 2017, some coming for political
reasons, and many more to flee economic catastrophe.120 The Colombian
president has noted that the movement may be “the most serious problem”
currently facing the country.121 The Constitutional Court has begun to
decide a large number of cases involving Venezuelan plaintiffs: the recent
volume has been sufficient for the president of the Constitutional Court to
express “concern” in a public interview.122 The Court has maintained its line
denying foreigners access to many health benefits while requiring that they
receive at least a minimum level of services, and perhaps has begun slowly
and cautiously building up a more expansive set of rights.
For example, in Decision T-314 of 2016, the Court reiterated that
foreigners irregularly present in the country had no right to accede to the
national healthcare system.123 It thus denied a request by a Venezuelan to
receive medicine and treatment for diabetes and held that his rights had not
been violated because he had received emergency treatment in a hospital. It
has also found that requiring Venezuelan children to possess documents
117 The “vital minimum” refers to the fundamental right to a level of subsistence necessary to
live a dignified existence, which has been the centerpiece of the Court’s extensive jurisprudence on
socioeconomic rights For a discussion of the significance of the concept, see DAVID LANDAU, THE
PROMISE OF A MINIMUM CORE APPROACH: THE COLOMBIAN MODEL FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
AUSTERITY MEASURES, IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
(Aoife Nolan, ed , Cambridge University Press, 2014)
118 See Sentencia C-834/07
119 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], octubre 9, 2003, Sentencia C913/03; Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], julio 4, 2017, Sentencia C-421/17
(emphasis added)
120 See Venezuelans Flock to Colombia in Last Half of 2017: Government, REUTERS, Jan 19, 2018, at
https://www reuters com/article/us-venezuela-colombia-immigration/venezuelans-flock-tocolombia-in-last-half-of-2017-government-idUSKBN1F81Z0
121 See Santos: Éxodo de venezolanos es el problema más serio de Colombia, EL NACIONAL, Feb 19, 2018,
at
http://www el-nacional com/noticias/mundo/santos-exodo-venezolanos-problema-mas-seriocolombia_223626
122 See Con tutelas, venezolanos reclaman derecho a la salud, EL TIEMPO, Feb 19, 2018, at
http://www eltiempo com/justicia/cortes/tutelas-de-venezolanos-para-pedir-proteccion-de-derechoa-la-salud-184294
123 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], junio 26, 2016, Sentencia T-314/16
See also Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 16, 2016, Sentencia T-728/16
(denying tutela for foreign petitioner seeking to be placed on organ transplant waiting list)
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attesting to legal status in order to attend school did not violate the
constitution.124
However, the Court also recently held that the healthcare system had to
both provide prenatal care for an expectant Venezuelan mother and register
her child in the system.125 Furthermore, the Court has protected petitioners
in situations where the government put unnecessary barriers in immigration
processes,126 and it has ordered the state to ensure that Venezuelans
performing sex work in Colombia should not be deported en masse without
adequate consideration of their individual circumstances.127 The latter
decision, which ordered a place of prostitution to be reopened, occasioned
harsh critiques that the Court had opened the door to massive migration of
Venezuelan sex workers and migrants more generally.128 Public statements
by the Court’s president on the Venezuelan crisis have emphasized the need
to balance protection of rights with limited resources and the rights of
Colombians to receive healthcare and other services.129
The point here of course is not to argue that the influx of migrants from
Venezuela poses the same problems, or imposes the same constitutional
obligations, as Colombian IDPs or victims of the internal armed conflict. It
is simply to suggest that the logic of solidarity that the Court has drawn upon
in protecting internal victims may be more difficult to construct for the
benefit of outsiders.

V. CONCLUSION
This article has explored the Colombian Constitutional Court’s use of
the internationalized orientation of the Constitution of 1991 to construct a
robust but flexible set of rights for the victims of that country’s internal
armed conflict. This achievement suggests several questions for
comparative research. The first is about constitutional design. A key feature
of the Constitution of 1991 is that it turned towards international law—
including provisions explicitly pointed towards outsiders, like the right to
asylum—chiefly as a vehicle for resolving a crisis of order and legitimacy,
124 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 26, 2017, Sentencia T-250/17
125 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 15, 2017, Sentencia SU677/17
126 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], julio 4, 2017, Sentencia T-421/17
(holding that the state was forcing a Venezuelan born of a Colombian father to go through “excessive
ritual” to verify his status)
127 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], febrero 6, 2017, Sentencia T-073/17
128 See, e.g., ¿Abrió puerta a migración masiva venezolana fallo de Corte sobre prostitutas de ese
país? EL PULZO, Apr 18, 2017, at http://www pulzo com/nacion/fallo-permite-prostitutas-venezolanasquedarse-colombia-PP251158 (collecting critiques of the decision from politicians and journalists)
129 See Con tutelas, venezolanos reclaman derecho a la salud, El Tiempo, Feb 19, 2018, at
http://www eltiempo com/justicia/cortes/tutelas-de-venezolanos-para-pedir-proteccion-de-derechoa-la-salud-184294
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and an international image crisis, linked to an internal armed conflict. In
other words, it turned outwards as a way to resolve an internal problem.
Such an orientation does not seem to be unusual, especially in the global
south. In South Africa, for example, constitutional drafters turned towards
international law as a way to signal a changed state and to help ensure that
the abuses of apartheid would not recur;130 in Mexico, reformers recently
created a similar link in part to overcome a domestic human rights crisis
linked to worsening violence.131 Designers may thus turn toward
international law and the external aspects of constitutionalism chiefly for
domestic reasons, and in these contexts international law may gain an
enhanced power as a source of authority.
A second comparative question is about the ways in which the different
strategies of courts can improve the political and social response towards
vulnerable populations like IDPs and refugees. The Court’s approach has
been to draw on the authority of international law in a flexible way that
forces the state to take account of the victims of internal armed conflict, but
which also provides the state with a wide range of options for resolving that
conflict. Whether such a strategy would work elsewhere, and whether the
result would change if the beneficiaries are more clearly cast as outsiders
rather than insiders, is a complex question. It may be possible for courts to
use a similar logic for the benefit of foreign migrants even in poor countries,
but the conditions under which such as strategy could work may be more
stringent. The Colombian case suggests that analysts should look not only
at the extent to which a constitution is turned towards the external,
providing rights for asylum seekers and other actors, but also the reasons
why such a turn has occurred. Moreover, judicial success may depend on
legal, political, and social discourses that allow for the construction of
solidarity with groups of “outsiders.”132 Further comparative analysis is thus
needed to illuminate the extent to which elements of the Colombian
constitutional strategy for victims of internal armed conflict are viable in
distinct contexts, such as in refugee crises that cross international borders.

130 See Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and Comparative
Constitutional Law, 1 U PENN J CONST L 205, 207–08 (1998)
131 See PEDRO SALAZAR UGARTE ET AL , LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL SOBRE DERECHOS
HUMANOS: UNA GUIA CONCEPTUAL (2014) (explaining the meaning and impact of a constitutional
reform that incorporated international human rights law into domestic constitutional law), available at
http://corteidh or cr/tablas/r33063 pdf
132 In South Africa, for example, the Court issued an order extending welfare benefits to
permanent residents residing in the country, and drew off of a solidarity logic It emphasized that
permanent resident aliens are “part of the South African community” and pay taxes that fund the
welfare programs they were subsequently being denied See Khosa and Others v Minister of Social
Development and Others, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) at para 74

